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Reverse perspective: Bernard Smith’s worldview 





Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved 
the way … The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country … In place of the 
old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, 
universal inter-dependence of nations … National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness 
become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, 
there arises a world literature.  




Living and working in Australia, and being the first Australian-born professional art 
historian to work in the academy, is probably enough of an explanation for why 
Bernard Smith developed a global perspective on European art and an acute 
awareness of its relationship to imperialism. Smith’s Marxist leanings reinforced 
such thinking, as did his ‘big picture’ approach. His worldview was not just global 
in a spatial sense it also took in the centuries indeed millennia of human culture. No 
wonder he found Hegel’s ideas compelling. It also means that the significance of 
Smith’s historiography can only be judged within an historical understanding of 
how globalization has impacted on the arts. 
This essay, comprising three parts, argues that Smith’s conception of 
globalization is grounded in an earlier era that has little relevance to the matrixes of 
power today. The first section, ‘A short history of globalization and the Western 
artworld’, outlines what is meant by globalization. It proposes that globalization is 
not simply a synchronous (spatial) relationship of power but also a diachronic one—
by which I mean that it is a developing formation with which critical methodology, 
including art historiography, must continually adjust. The first stage of 
globalization, I argue, came on the horizon around 1500 but took several hundred 
years to leave behind previous ideological frameworks and give shape to the world. 
I am calling this shape the classic idea of Europe, by which I mean the cultural 
identity forged during the Enlightenment that gave European nations a moral 
purpose, a sense of destiny and the impression of being a civilization that was 
primarily defined in terms of modernity. In this I follow closely Gerard Delanty’s 
writing on what he calls ‘the idea of Europe’, drawing extensively on his book 
Inventing Europe (1995). 
The classic idea of Europe was irreparably broken in the carnage of the 1914-
18 war but it took until the end of the Cold War for the dust to settle. Only then did 
Ian McLean Reverse perspective: Bernard Smith’s worldview …  
 2 
a second stage of globalization begin to be felt at an ideological level and in 
everyday lives. The first section focuses on describing the formation of the classic 
idea of Europe and its unraveling in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This 
sets the stage for the main argument concerning Smith’s historiography.  
The discourse of art history is an expression of the classic idea of Europe. 
Certainly art historians invested in the idea of Europe from the beginning i.e. from 
the time of Johann Winckelmann, and it is from here that Smith somewhat 
anachronistically takes his bearings. It is anachronistic as Smith’s career was more or 
less co-terminus with the Cold War—his The Antipodean manifesto (1959) has been 
called a Cold War document—a time when the classic idea of Europe was 
significantly repackaged as ‘the idea of West’ (as I will call it).  
While Smith was intent on writing for his time, he was never comfortable in 
his time. Indeed, the older he got the more uncomfortable he became. Thus he never 
saw himself as an apologist for his time. His perspective was critical, and drew on 
the classic idea of Europe and the world-view or cosmopolitanism of its classic art 
historiography to make his point. The purpose of this first section, then, is to 
establish an historical framework in which to position my argument regarding the 
anachronism of Bernard Smith’s art historiography. I should add that by 
anachronism I do not mean that he was reactionary or even conservative. Smith 
radicalism was well deserved.1 
The second section, ‘Bernard Smith, the Western artworld and globalization’, 
examines Smith’s art historiography in the light of the Cold War paradigm of 
Western art. The Antipodean manifesto is used as a focus for this discussion, before a 
closer investigation is made of the world-consciousness or cosmopolitanism of 
Smith’s historiography, which I characterize as ‘reverse perspective’.   
The third section, which also serves as a conclusion, ‘Smith, Winckelmann and 
the idea of Europe’, takes a closer look at why Winckelmann’s historiography 
appealed to Smith and why it ultimately failed him. 
 
1. A short history of globalization and the Western artworld 
 
In the last few decades the term ‘globalization’ has become the buzzword to 
describe the deterritorializing effects of new communication and information 
technologies. These effects, which intensified considerably in the last two decades, 
are penetrating all levels of society from the economic to the political, legal and 
cultural. In particular, they are challenging the institutions and ideals of the nation-
state that have ordered, administered and conceptualized the world for the previous 
few hundred years. A new cosmopolitanism—another buzzword—is emerging that 
seemingly spells the end of such national formations and identities, including 
national art histories. Even art historians are having to confront the challenge of  
1  Smith’s anachronism is evident in the ambivalence towards his writing, ranging from those who 
feel his conservatism to those who acknowledge his radicalism. For the former see: Ian Burn, Lendon, 
Nigel, Merewether, Charles, and Stephen, Ann, The Necessity of Australian Art : An Essay About 
Interpretation (Sydney: Power Publications, 1988). For the latter, see Peter Beilharz, Imagining the 
Antipodes : Culture, Theory, and the Visual in the Work of Bernard Smith, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
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globalization with new more cosmopolitan historiographies. This, anyway, is where 
we seem to be at this moment, a decade into the twenty-first century. 
While globalization and cosmopolitanism are closely associated in current 
discourse, they describe quite different things. As Delanty points out, 
cosmopolitanism is much older than globalization.2 Cosmopolitan ideas are evident 
in tribal cosmologies, they form the ethical basis of world religions, and in the 
European philosophical tradition they derive from Biblical and classical Greek texts. 
Cosmopolitanism is also, argues Delanty, ‘one of the key dynamics of modernity’ 
and also nationalism even if today it largely takes postmodern and post-national 
forms.3 In other words, cosmopolitanism is a ubiquitous tendency evident to some 
extent in all cultures. Delanty conceives it as a universal ‘orientation’ that ‘takes 
different forms and can be found in many different cultural contexts’4—a sort of 
hard-wired sensibility whose particular expression reflects the environment or 
worldview in which it is shaped.  
Globalization, on the other hand, refers to various technologies and ideologies 
that have enabled interconnections to develop on a global scale. A globalized 
worldview, or world-consciousness, first emerged in the aftermath of Columbus’s 
momentous voyage of 1492. While globalization is largely driven by technological 
innovation, it is managed by ideological systems with their own agendas. Three 
phases can be identified: imperialism or the Age of Europe, the Cold War or the Age 
of the West, and the phase of intensified globalization we now inhabit. Art 
historiography emerged in the first phase as a discourse that legitimatized 
imperialism, it was forced to change track during the Cold War, and in recent 
decades is undergoing an even more fundamental revision.  
 
Imperialism or the Age of Europe  
According to Delanty, 1492 marks a threshold between the hegemony of 
Christendom and that of Europe. Christendom, which we now call the medieval 
period, was a product of isolation. The isolation began when the Roman Empire 
abandoned its Latin-speaking western provinces and shifted its capital east to 
Constantinople, where it evolved into the Byzantine Christian Empire. The isolation 
of the Latins increased following the collapse of the Western Empire and doctrinal 
splits with the Greek-speaking Byzantine church. This was further exasperated by 
the slow disintegration of the Byzantine Empire before the rising tide of Islam, and 
then the failure of the Latin crusaders to take the Holy Land from Islam, which was 
the spiritual centre of Christendom. Latin Christendom was boxed into a corner 
without a centre, isolated from its spiritual homeland and also most of the world.  
Rather incongruously—given dominant Western theories of modernity—
Delanty believes that the final surrender of the Byzantine Empire to Islam in 1453 
‘was one of the really decisive events in the formation of European modernity’,5 
because it also marked the beginning of the end for Christendom as an ideological  
2  Gerard Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory, Leiden: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, 8, ch. 1. 
3  Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, 9, 16. 
4  Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, 9. 
5  Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: idea, identity, reality, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 36 
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force. It also made Columbus’s opening of the western frontier game changing. By 
outflanking Islam in the east it created the possibility of a whole new paradigm for 
the beleaguered Latins. This new paradigm eventually became the classic idea of 
Europe. During the sixteenth century, Delanty writes, ‘the idea of Europe began to 
replace Christendom as a cultural frame of reference.’6 
Columbus’s voyage discovered more than America and the world. As well it 
discovered Europe as a continent, an identity and civilization.7 Arguably, the idea of 
Europe was more clearly seen by European colonists than those who stayed at 
home. The classic idea of Europe first took shape from a distance: it is an idea of (or 
perspective on) the world that takes its bearings from Europe. In Delanty’s words: 
‘Colonialism and conquest … unified Europe’8 and gave it its identity.  
However, the idea of Europe did not spring into view from the decks of the 
Santa Maria (Columbus’s flagship) as it passed over the horizon in 1492. Delanty 
argues that the idea of Europe could not take shape until it found a way of dealing 
with the legacy of Christendom. It was a volatile mix. The whole politics of power 
was shaken from top to bottom in religious, political, economic and cultural 
upheavals from which eventually emerged the classic idea of Europe, embodied in 
the modern European nation states, their world empires and practices of modernity. 
Here globalization was administered by a few powerful nation states, in whose 
capitals were centred the discourses of modernity.  
Thus while Enrique Dussel has a point when, in a similar vein to Delanty, he 
claims that ‘modernity was born in 1492’ (Dussel 1996: 20), it is important to 
acknowledge the delay between the ending of Christendom and the emergence of 
modernity and its primary ideological formation, the nation state in the nineteenth 
century. Only then did the classic idea of Europe assume its hegemony. The classic 
idea of Europe, then, is a symptom of modernity fully formed. ‘A collective 
European identity existed (at least as part of elite culture) in some form since the 
sixteenth century’, but ‘European identity as part of personal identities did not exist 
until the late nineteenth century though it had gradually evolved since the 
Enlightenment.’9  
This first phase of globalization, which culminated in the late-nineteenth 
century, was the golden age of Europe—appropriately named the Belle Époque. In 
essence, it was an imperialist age in which the idea of Europe was the justification. 
To this day, Delanty says: ‘Much of what is being called “European” is … thinly 
disguised, nineteenth century imperialist ideas’.10 However, ‘the idea of [European] 
civilization did not survive into the twentieth century’. Its critique was, says 
Delanty, ‘one of the great themes in fin-de-siècle [avant-garde] thinking’,11 which was 
cosmopolitan and anti-nationalist in character. The 1914-18 war delivered the fatal 
blow to the classic idea of Europe. From this point, ‘the centre of gravity shifted 
across the Atlantic’, and a new paradigm ‘was constructed around opposition to  
6  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 37. 
7  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 44. 
8  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 7.  
9  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 6.  
10  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 6.  
11  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 109.  
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Soviet communism’.12 What briefly sustained the beleaguered and indeed mortally 
wounded idea of Europe was, in Delanty’s apt phrase, ‘the communist bogey’13 from 
the east, as if Islam had returned in a new guise. It was the twilight of the classic 
idea of Europe, for in this final desperate unraveling of the first stage of 
globalization, the idea of Europe was substituted for the idea of the West. 
The World Wars of the twentieth century and especially the atom bomb that 
ended the Second and effectively inaugurated the Cold War completely changed the 
imperialist dynamic of globalization. The imminence of world destruction defined 
world-consciousness in the decades after 1945, simultaneously uniting the world in 
despair and splitting it (as well as Europe) into two mutually opposed autonomous 
but mirror-like spheres. Simply called East and West, they were dominated by the 
economic and cultural hegemonies of the Soviet Union and the United States 
respectively, each of which had its own global network of power.  
In contrast to the classic idea of Europe, whose values had been fashioned by 
the complex tensions of European national rivalry, the West was a united entity, 
with Western Europe subordinate to the United States. Thus ‘the nation-state was 
no longer the reference point’; rather ‘the idea of the West was the new reference 
point for Europe which had effectively become America’s eastern frontier.’14 
Despite this profoundly different post-European and post-colonial scenario, 
the West found its moral legitimization in the defense of so-called Occidental 
civilization. Its governing myth was the continuity of the European idea, just as the 
European idea had, in many ways, constructed itself as the ‘secular surrogate’ of 
Christendom.15 Each age, it seems, imagines itself with the remnants of the previous 
one: as if from the ashes of tragedy is rescued farce (apologies to Marx). In the idea 
of the West the classical idea of Europe is a symbol of cultural value. Instead of 
warring national states, Europe became a romantic place of old world cities and 
extraordinary museums that American tourists could visit for their edification. The 
classic idea of Europe was thus reduced to an ‘aesthetic category’.16 This was starkly 
evident in the institutionalization of the avant-garde after the 1914-18 war, which 
thus became avant-garde in name only. But like any brand it had wide appeal. 
Falling into line with the new paradigm, the artworld becoming a highly integrated 
and greatly expanded trans-Atlantic discourse centred in New York. In much the 
same fashion that the ancient Romans had appropriated ancient Greek art, the 
Western artworld made over old Europe into its own image, and in the process 
invented a whole new teleology, seamless in appearance, in which all roads now led 
to New York. This, in essence, is the narrative of post-war art historiography that 
Bernard Smith resisted. 
 
 
12  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 107.  
13  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 101.  
14  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 129.  
15  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 68.  
16  Delanty, Inventing Europe, 116. 
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The second stage of globalization 
From about 1968 the powerful cultural politburos of both East and West began to 
lose legitimacy as dissidents increasingly eroded their ideological logic. So too did 
new technological developments. As Marshall McLuhan declared in the early 1960s, 
the world was rapidly becoming a global village. While the Cold War did not 
officially end until December 1989, when it did the world rapidly changed as if it 
had been waiting for this moment. In just two decades we have seen an increasingly 
independent and expanded ‘post-Western’ Europe,17 a resurgent China, a ham-
fisted United States struggling to find its place, and a host of other developments. 
Yet, despite being an artifact of the Cold War, the Western artworld has largely 
maintained its cultural hegemony, though not without disquiet.  
Symptomatic of both this continuing Cold War hegemony is the massive book, 
Art since 1900, written by Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss, Yve Alain Bois and Benjamin 
H. D. Buchloh. While written some 15 years after the official end of the Cold War, it 
articulates the vision of an ancien régime. However, there is also disquiet. With some 
poignancy, the book’s last page concludes on a note of defeat and loss. This is 
because every new future brings with it a new past. Now, after the end of the Cold 
War, the acievements of Western art that they had just memorialized seemed over. 
All Foster could see was the ‘posthistorical default of contemporary art’ in which 
there is a ‘flat indifference, a stagnant incommensurability, a consumerist-touristic 
culture of art sampling’. He identified a fundamental change in the experience of art 
past and present, lamenting that now ‘we wander through museum spaces as if 
after the end of time.’ In short, Art since 1900 chronicled a world—or an order—that 
no longer exists.  
Art since 1900 is literally structured as a chronicle. Now a chronicle, says 
Walter Benjamin, is a teleological discourse that describes a model of the world as if 
it is a divine plan. It calls not for historical explanation but hermeneutic 
interpretation of the way events ‘are embedded in the great inscrutable course of the 
world.’18 But this course had suddenly changed, as if God had taken leave of the 
world. Even the twentieth century, through which Foster had recently wandered 
with such assurance as if it was his neighbourhood, now seems a foreign country. 
The ‘primary models we’ve used’, says Foster, ‘have become dysfunctional’, and 
‘none of us [New York critics] is in a position to comment on what projects might be 
emerging in other parts of the globe’. With an air of desperation, he admitted his 
inability to answer ‘the question of the narrativity of art in a global context’.19  
At issue now is not simply the content of art history but its very structure and 
purpose. In short, the conventional methodologies no longer work. At a purely 
formal level, the recent intensification of globalization spells the end to linear 
conceptions of history and the reification of style, both key concepts that had 
galvanized European art and art historiography since its formation in the nineteenth  
17  Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, 241.  
18  Walter Benjamin, 'The Storyteller', in Hannah Arendt (ed.), Illuminations, Bungay, Suffolk: Fontana, 
1982, 96.  
19  Hal Foster in Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss, Yve-Alain Bois and Benjamin Buchloh, 'Roundtable: The 
Predicament of Contemporary Art', in Hal Foster, Rosalind Krauss, Yve-Alain Bois and Benjamin 
Buchloh (ed.), Art since 1900: Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism, London: Thames & Hudson, 
2004, 679.  
Ian McLean Reverse perspective: Bernard Smith’s worldview …  
 7 
century and were eagerly adopted by Cold War era art historians.20 Instead of a 
teleology in which the present races towards some pre-ordained end—in this case 
the hegemony of the West—now the past continuously cycles through the present 
disrupting all teleological narratives. Space, previously tied to the formal constraints 
of the picture plane, also gained an ever-increasing mobility that reached out to the 
world; and style, once the principal signifier of an artist’s identity and the art’s 
meaning, now is simply an empty avatar, a vehicle for fluid subject positions in an 
open field. 
The temporal, spatial and stylistic legacies of European modernism no longer 
drive contemporary art.21 The production and consumption of contemporary art in 
the twenty-first century is not, as in the previous century, the God-given birthright 
of Europeans or Westerners. Instead it is a set of autonomous styles disconnected 
from any historicist project (such as modernism or the avant-garde) and 
contemporaneously available to anyone anywhere in the world. Existing in the 
perpetual now, style, like the past or the future, can be downloaded at will. Now 
anybody anywhere anytime can make European, Aboriginal or any other type of 
art, as it is all just contemporary art.  
Equally, the intensification of globalization is destabilizing conventional art 
historiography that, in the main, was inherited from the nineteenth-century German 
professors who founded the discipline. Thus today revisionism is rife. The old 
Eurocentric hierarchies get more tenuous everyday and even the notion of period 
style—which Bernard Smith described as ‘the central concept of art history’22 and 
the justification of its claim as an autonomous discipline—seems shaky, not least 
because it no longer has any teleological or even genealogical guarantee i.e. has a 
place in the course of time.  
Once the means by which art historians delineated the historicity of art, now 
period style is simply a brand with which the modern art museum trades in its 
spectacles of the post-historical. This loss of orientation is not just a problem for art 
historiography but the symptom of a larger failure of critical discourse in general to 
produce what Delanty called a ‘significant philosophical or methodological 
framework’23 capable of dealing with the impact of globalization today. The failure 
of art historiography to ‘provide the basis for a truly global and intercultural art 
history’—as David Summers put it—surely calls, as John Onians did, for ‘a whole 
new approach to the subject.’24 This, however, is where Bernard Smith, who has 
always thought in terms of a world-consciousness, disagrees. 
  
20  For an early recognition of this radical shift (1995), see Hans Belting, Art History after Modernism, 
trans. Mitch Cohen and Kenneth Northcott Caroline Saltzwedel, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2003.  
21  This is hardly an original observation. The writings of Arthur Danto, Hans Belting, Terry Smith and 
others in the previous fifteen or so years have made such observations a cliché of contemporary art 
criticism. 
22  Bernard Smith, The Formalesque: A Guide to Modern Art and Its History, Melbourne: Macmillan, 2007, 
44.  
23  Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, 1.  
24  This point, and the quotes, is taken from Ulrich Pfisterer, 'Origins and Principles of World Art 
History: 1900 (and 2000)', in Kitty Zijlmans and Wilfried Van Damme (eds.), World Art Studies: 
Exploring Concepts and Approaches, Amsterdam: Valiz, 2008, 69. 
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2. Bernard Smith, the Western artworld and globalization  
 
The Cold War was long enough to consume most of Bernard Smith’s professional 
life. However, like Don Quixote, Smith brushed against the grain of his times by 
holding to an earlier chivalry. Smith combined a propensity to theorize with an eye 
for the big picture, for the clash of civilizations and the workings of what Hegel 
called the Spirit, all of which he orchestrated into a critique of the Western 
worldview that dominated this period. While few art histories written in the Cold 
War period can, like Smith’s European Vision and the South Pacific (1960), claim a 
world-consciousness, as the title suggests, it was a consciousness formed in a 
previous time when the classic idea of Europe was finally becoming hegemonic—
the period that is the subject of the book.  
Even admitting the achievement of European Vision, Smith’s credentials as an 
historian of globalization would seem farfetched. In that obscure part of the world 
where he is best known, he is known as an historian of national not world art. 
However Smith’s first book, Place, taste and tradition—published on 6 August 1945, 
the day that the atom bomb was dropped in Hiroshima—is a history of Australian 
art grounded in the necessary relationship between the global and the local, which 
he construed as the antidote to the shrill nationalism of certain Australian art critics 
at the time.25 In particular, it proposed an alternative worldview to a new 
Mitteleuropa conception of the European idea that had developed in the early 
twentieth century as a reaction to the crisis of the idea of Europe, most famously in 
Nazi ideology.26  
Despite the cosmopolitanism of Smith’s national art history, the very idea of 
national art did not sit easily with the post-war marginalization of nationalism or 
with the ‘basic intuition’ of today’s globalization ‘that the nation-state no longer 
provides … the natural space of social scientific articulation.’27 Combined with 
Smith’s well-known antipathy towards abstract art28—which was internationalist—
then it is little wonder that his views seemed somewhat anachronistic and out of 
step with contemporary art. This is most apparent in the 1959 Antipodean manifesto, 
which Smith wrote with a group of emerging Australian artists from his generation. 
The manifesto attacked the new international abstraction emanating from New York 
and called for a figurative art that attended to the social myths that are the mainstay 
of national culture.29  
 
The Antipodean manifesto  
Despite Smith’s professional interest in national art, he did share both the earlier 
European avant-garde and post-war Western avant-garde antipathy towards 
nationalism. This is why the manifesto insisted, somewhat against the grain of its  
25  See Bernard Smith, Place, Taste and Tradition: A Study of Australian Art since 1788, Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1979, 176-80.  
26  See Delanty, Inventing Europe, ch. 7.  
27  Robert Fine and Vivienne Boon, 'Introduction: Cosmopolitanism: Between Past and Future', 
European Journal of Social Theory, 10: 1, 2007, 6 
28  See Bernard Smith, 'Notes on Abstract Art', in The Death of the Artist as Hero: Essays in History and 
Culture, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988, 181-93.  
29  Bernard Smith, 'The Antipodean Manifesto', in The Death of the Artist as Hero, 1988, 197. 
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own thought, that ‘we are not, of course, seeking to create a national style.’30 Yet, to 
many, it seemed that his denial only masked his intentions to do just this, 
particularly as he was resisting the new so-called ‘internationalism’ of Cold War 
Western art.31  
Smith later took every opportunity to reiterate that ‘nationalism was never a 
real issue’.32 Further, as if to distract from what had quickly become its 
embarrassing reputation as anachronistic, Smith argued that the manifesto’s attack 
on abstraction should be placed ‘in its international context’, which he said was the 
emerging avant-garde reaction against abstraction evident in Pop art.33 However, 
this was either wishful thinking or an ignorance of Pop art —especially since against 
the neo-Dada grain of Pop he had declared in the Antipodean manifesto that ‘Dada is 
as dead as the dodo’.34 However the manifesto did have an international context, 
which was not Pop art but the Cold War. Smith agreed with Terry Smith that it was 
‘a Cold War document’.35  
Smith’s retrospective explanation of the international context in which he 
wrote the manifesto is revealing. ‘I must have been’, Smith wrote, ‘one of the first 
Australians to witness the new American dogma’ as it emerged around 1950, and in 
it ‘I found myself confronted with a mirror image of the dogmas of socialist 
realism.’36 Smith was seeking a third way, a non-aligned art that ascribed to neither 
the East nor West: thus his criticism of both US abstraction and Socialist Realism. In 
this respect the Antipodean manifesto is a typical Smith document. Smith was writing 
at a time when the horizon of social identity had been skewed by the new binary 
world order of the Cold War. Then, when the Western artworld spoke of the avant-
garde’s internationalism, its horizon was the new integrated trans-Atlantic world of 
Western Europe and New York, not the globe. Smith’s reputation as an historian of 
national art is deserved, but if his histories are written against the grain of Western 
avant-gardism they are written within the context of a global rather than Western 
worldview and one that identifies with the classic idea of Europe and an earlier 
European avant-garde culture.  
 
Smith’s worldview 
While Smith stands against the Western artworld’s narrowing worldview, his 
world-consciousness is grounded in pre-Cold War patterns of thinking. Smith was 
no Marshall McLuhan. His notion of globalization derives from the classic idea of 
Europe and its critique by the early-twentieth century avant-garde. Its ideas 
provided the basis of his critique of the Western idea. However, if wrong footed his 
critique remains timely, as art historiography and critical thinking more generally 
has failed ‘to respond to globalization and move beyond a preoccupation with an  
30  Bernard Smith, 'The Antipodean Manifesto', 195.  
31  Smith was defended from an unlikely quarter, the internationalist Robert Hughes, who observed 
that Smith was not, ‘as some critics at the time mistakenly thought, trying to promote Australiana’. 
(Robert Hughes, The Art of Australia, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970, 246.) 
32  Smith, 'Notes on Abstract Art', 193.  
33  Smith, 'Notes on Abstract Art', 193. 
34  Smith, 'The Antipodean Manifesto', 195.  
35  Bernard Smith, 'The Truth About the Antipodeans', The Death of the Artist as Hero, 202. 
36  Smith, 'Notes on Abstract Art', 186.  
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exclusively Western range of issues’.37 Smith’s historiography reminds us that the 
discipline originally had a larger worldview. Indeed, he finds it curious that 
globalization is proving so momentous for the discipline when the world is hardly a 
new discovery and the Enlightenment, of which the discipline of art history is a 
product, is distinguished by its cosmopolitanism—as he showed in European vision. 
This, in part, explains why he turns away from the current revisionism, defending 
the old German professors to the end. 
Smith was attracted to art history in his formative years because of its 
worldview. From Australia even the most Eurocentric art history has a world-
dimension, and thus was an antidote to the nationalist ideology that had 
increasingly alarmed the young Smith. To him its posturing was an evil wind. This 
is why Spengler’s and Toynbee’s world histories appealed to him, not just 
intellectually, but at a deep emotional even spiritual level. Their worldview, while 
conscious that the idea of Europe was at its end, was nevertheless fashioned from its 
precepts. It pre-disposed Smith to the founding fathers or art historiography, whom 
he considered to be Winckelmann and Hegel.38  
Spengler was one of Winckelmann’s many German admirers, and his Decline 
of the West had a huge impact on Smith in his early twenties. Spengler argued that 
the modern age owes it spirit and character to the de-centred Copernican universe 
and its extension to the earth following Europe’s discoveries of the New World. 
From that point, wrote Spengler, ‘West-Europe became a province in a gigantic 
whole. Thenceforward the history of the Western Culture has a planetary 
character.’39 
If Spengler’s world-picture orientated the young Smith, his main guide to 
delineating the forces and tendencies of globalization was Marx. Marx understood 
capitalism as a force of globalization, and one whose relations penetrated every 
aspects of social life. Imperialism, which was capitalism in action at its inevitable 
global scale, was not simply an economic and political force but also a cultural one. 
This is the basic thesis of Smith’s Place, taste and tradition, which he claimed is the 
first Marxist history of a national art. Smith even recognized the relationship 
between Imperialism and Winckelmann’s investigations,40 as if imperialism was a 
hegemonic ideology that penetrated the most arcane places of academia, including 
art historiography.  
However, as Smith argued in Modernism’s history, if imperialism was 
hegemonic it was neither homogenous nor the be-all of globalization.41 The principal 
agents of imperialism may have been a cabal centered in Europe’s capitals, but 
imperialism also produced counter currents. Marxism was particularly interested in 
these counter currents, especially as they played out in nationalist anti-colonial 
movements across the world after the 1914-18 war. In this respect Smith pre-empted 
Dussel’s argument that the critical side of modernity had its origins in Europe’s 
colonies, not Europe, and that ‘a great part of the achievements of modernity were  
37  Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, 2. 
38  See Smith, The Formalesque, 44.  
39  Spengler, Oswald, The decline of the West, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1934, 334.   
40  Smith, Place, Taste and Tradition, 25.  
41  See especially Bernard Smith, Modernism's History: A Study of Twentieth-Century Art and Ideas, 
Sydney: UNSW Press, 1998, 305-42. 
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not exclusively European but rose from a continuous dialectic of impact and 
counter-impact, effect and counter-effect, between modern Europe and its 
periphery.’42 This dialectical model of resistance and adaptation at a cultural level 
structured Smith’s historiography, and has proved its most lasting and influential 
aspect.43  
One way of picturing the historiography of Smith’s worldview is through 
the optics of perspective. Spengler argued that Renaissance perspective was a 
Copernican technology for delineating infinite space, which is why it has often been 
considered a metaphor of imperialism and even a paradigm for the idea of Europe. 
As if pre-figuring the Kantian subject, perspectival space gave priority ‘to the 
observer, who in choosing his distance asserts his dominion’ (Spengler)44 and so 
imposes his vision upon the world. In this scheme Smith’s art historiography is a 
reverse perspective that, like Cubism, makes the world and not the viewer’s eye the 
vanishing point.  
After the 1939-45 war, as the resistance to European imperialism intensified 
in wars of national liberation, Europe became increasingly conscious of the world’s 
gaze upon it. This is when European vision was written. Well in advance of any other 
art history it embodies this new reverse-perspective of the postcolonial period. It 
might have been more accurately titled The South Pacific in European Vision, as its 
thesis, to quote Smith, is that: ‘with the expansion of European culture over the 
globe it is the exotic frontier cultures which have to a large extent determined taste 
and much of the movement of style’.45 However, European vision remains a quasi-
postcolonial document because for Smith the Empire speaks back in the frame of the 
Empire—i.e. within the discursive parameters of the classic idea of Europe. 
With this in mind, we can better appreciate Smith’s unique geographical take 
on the German professors. His distant vision penetrated their local motives, 
reconfiguring their art historiography for his time and place. As previously 
mentioned, the perspective of Europeans in Australia is invariably global because 
they feel what Geoffrey Blainey called ‘the tyranny of distance’.46 The anxiety and 
alienation of isolation is the recurring cliché of European-Australian art 
historiography and also the European-Australian psyche. In 1974 Terry Smith called 
it the ‘provincialism problem’.47 No wonder that Robert Hughes, reiterating the 
opening sentence of Place, taste and tradition in his book on Australian art, 
concluded: ‘the chief interest which Australian painting holds for historians’ is ‘the 
vexed relationship between Australian and overseas art.’48  
Bernard Smith had three original things to say about Australia’s so-called 
isolation. Firstly, it is greatly exaggerated; secondly, it has the stupefying or  
42  Enrique Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricouer, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of 
Liberation, trans. Eduardo Mendiesa, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 
1996, 132. 
43  In particular it preempted postcolonial histories, such as those by Nicholas Thomas, who was very 
influenced by European vision. 
44  Spengler, The Decline of the West, 311.  
45  Bernard Smith, 'The Myth of Isolation', The Death of the Artist as Hero, 1988, 229 
46  Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance, South Melbourne: Sun Books, 1974.  
47  Terry Smith, 'The Provincialism Problem', Art Forum, 13:1, September 1974, 54–59.  
48  Hughes, The Art of Australia, 23. 
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hypnotic effect of myth; and thirdly, it reflected a Eurocentric mindset that espoused 
what he considered to be the preposterous belief that Australia is home to ‘an exotic 
art … standing outside the Renaissance tradition’.49 Smith was referring to European 
art in Australia, not Indigenous art—which then was invisible to Australian art 
historiography.  
Smith also noted that the myth of isolation has two opposed perspectives: 
the imperialist perspective of cultural cringe and a reverse-perspective in which the 
exotic determines taste and style, a vital primitivism that lent the exotic an uncanny 
power. Art historiography, he argued in a most original way, was founded on this 
latter perspective. This is why he insisted that Winckelmann’s historiography, and 
indeed a general stirring at the time across Europe for ancient Greece, was ‘Europe’s 
first “Primitivism”’.50  
Smith recognized in Winckelmann’s historiography something of his own 
situation as an Australian art historian. Commenting on Winckelmann’s attraction 
to a far off place and time (i.e. ancient Greece), Smith wrote: ‘Distance is not a 
tyranny to serious historians; it is a challenge. It restrains him or her from being 
advocates of their own place and time.’51 In other words, he recognizes the 
cosmopolitan impulse that founded art historiography, namely seeking an 
encounter with the other in order to make strange one’s own position. If Smith was 
also making a wry aside at the age of 90 on his own practice, his real purpose was to 
insist on the planetary perspective of the discipline in order to counter, in his words: 
‘A common criticism made of art history, advanced by revisionist and 
contemporary critics … that it is Eurocentric.’52 Citing Gottfried Semper, Alois Riegl, 
Aby Warburg and even the Nazi supporter Josef Strzygowski—i.e. a century-long 
period from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries that Michael Podro 
dubbed the ‘central tradition’53—Smith argued that from its beginning the discipline 
was intensely interested in the world and not just Europe.54 To him, it seemed, the 
problem was not with the discipline but with the amnesia of new-generation 
practitioners and more generally the Eurocentric tendencies of post-war art 
historiography. No wonder Smith was particularly pleased by Gombrich’s last book, 
The preference for the primitive (2002). Not only did its scope conform to his sense of 
what art history is but it also mentioned his own work.55 
If Smith’s reverse-perspective seemingly offers a new way of doing art 
historiography, Smith insisted on its radical return to origins. His motive was to 
legitimize his own practice within a discipline that, as he often complained, had 
become obsessively Eurocentric. However, while Smith found comfort in 
Winckelmann’s cosmopolitanism, to what extent could Winckelmann’s eighteenth-
century concerns—which might be considered a manifesto of the classic idea of 
Europe—be of use to Smith let alone the twenty-first century?   
49  Smith, 'The Myth of Isolation', 229. 
50  Smith, The Formalesque, 45. 
51  Smith, The Formalesque, 40.  
52  Smith, The Formalesque, 44.  
53  Michael Podro, The Critical Historians of Art, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, xv. 
54  See Smith, The Formalesque, 44-49.  
55  See E. H. Gombrich, The Preference for the Primitive: Episodes in the History of Western Art and Taste 
(London: Phaidon, 2002), 177, 94, 218.  
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3. Smith, Winckelmann and the idea of Europe  
 
Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, Winckelmann developed an art 
historiography that articulated the classic idea of Europe. Like many Enlightenment 
thinkers, he envisaged it as an alternative to Christendom and the ancien régime from 
which a new world was struggling to be born. He looked to the Ottoman east, but to 
an earlier time before Christendom and the Islamic empire, when the Mediterranean 
was the hub of the known world, just as Europe now was the hub of global empires. 
Importantly, in terms of the argument being developed here, Winckelmann 
employed a cosmopolitan imagination and one that follows the precepts of that self-
declared ‘citizen of the world’56 and renowned classical Greek philosopher, 
Diogenes. Like him, Winckelmann sought to cut through conventions to the nature 
of things. Thus, it was obvious to Winckelmann that notions of beauty invariably 
involved the projection of conventions, in this case ethnic values. To counter such 
prejudice, he looked beyond his local habitus to ancient Greece, which he treated as a 
sort of utopia. Since the sixteenth century the utopian trope had been a feature of 
thinkers seeking to develop a new idea of Europe. Not only did the ancient world 
not exist, as is often pointed out, ‘Greece as we know it today did not exist’ in 
Winckelmann’s time. Hence it ‘was perfectly suited to represent a utopian … artistic 
ideal.’57 Smith is more precise in recognizing Winckelmann’s primitivism, noting 
that then ‘Greece was under the control of the Ottoman Empire.’58 Like a true 
primitivist and indeed cosmopolitan, Winckelmann identified with the other, in this 
case the pagan other of Christendom.59 The idea of ancient Greece was then a form 
of self-estrangement, a way of thinking about an alternative Europe. 
In particular, Winckelmann’s cosmopolitan interest in ancient Greece was an 
expression of his estrangement from Europe’s ancien régimes, which drew their 
authority from Rome, and his desire for a new type of European. He lent his utopian 
vision substance by grounding it in ethnocentric terms, albeit ethnocentric terms 
intended to make strange the old world values of Christendom. He drew direct 
analogies between the universal qualities of ‘good taste’ and the character of ancient 
Greeks as a people. His claim, in the preface to The history of ancient art, that he 
sought ‘to execute this design in regard to the art of each nation individually, but 
specially with reference to that of the Greeks’,60 seems innocent enough but hardly 
prepares the reader for the extraordinary degree to which he locates the origins of 
beauty and the superiority of Greek art in Greek ethnicity, in which he claims that 
the beauty of the ancient Greek body is the direct model of the statutes that he so  
56  Laërtius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers  at Book 6, 63.  
57  Hans Belting, The Germans and Their Past: A Troublesome Relationship, trans. Scott Kleager, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, 17. 
58  Smith, The Formalesque, 45 
59  Robert Fine and Vivienne Boon define the cosmopolitan project as framed by universal notions of 
humanism in which: ‘It is through the act of looking through the eye of the Other, through a 
flourishing of Otherness, that we are able to see the nature of humanity.’ (Fine, 'Introduction: 
Cosmopolitanism: Between Past and Future', 6) 
60  Johann Joachim Winckelmann, The History of Ancient Art, trans. G. Henry Lodge, Volume 1, Boston: 
James R. Osgood and Company, 1880, 107.  
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admired. Thus Winckelmann’s ethno-political-aesthetic tendencies combine into an 
historiography that, said Donald Preziosi, is written as a narrative of ‘an entire 
national artistic tradition … [art] was made to bear the burden of being an emblem 
of the totality of a people’s culture: its quintessential expression. To understand a 
people’s art was to understand that people in the deepest possible way.’61 Ironic as it 
may now seem, Winckelmann’s cosmopolitan aesthetic-ethnology presages the 
metaphors of national identity that would soon galvanize the classic idea of Europe 
and its discourse of modernity.  
This particular matrix of cosmopolitanism, nationalism and ethnocentrism 
reverberates through the age of imperialism and modernity, and also throughout 
Smith’s historiography. It origins are in the Enlightenment’s contestation of the 
universal claims made by Christendom i.e. the Roman Catholic Church. By 
Winckelmann’s time these claims had been contested for over 200 years by the 
Protestant rebellions; and in this respect Winckelmann’s ethno-paganism can be 
considered a type of Protestantism. More to the point, he was writing 100 years after 
the Treaty of Westphalia that settled these religious divisions across Europe, and 
which effectively set the agenda for the development of the nation-state in Europe. 
Over the next 100 years, this agenda would be played out with particular intensity 
in Germany.  
This wider context of the European idea, which came to fruition in the 
nineteenth century, framed art historiography from its beginning, as if it was a 
discourse designed to invent myths of nationhood. Here ethnicity is an ideal that, in 
Winckelmann’s historiography, does the work of the universal to which particular 
expressions must gesture if not conform. Paradoxically, Winckelmann’s initial use of 
the East to critique Europe—which was a common strategy of European 
intellectuals at the time—articulated the classic idea of Europe that has dominated 
cultural history since, namely that Europe is heir to ancient Greece and ancient 
Greece is proto-European62—as if Christendom and Europe’s then isolation from the 
East and the world had never happened. In Dussel’s somewhat cynical words, this 
‘ideological invention … kidnapped Greek culture as exclusively western and 
European and then posited both the Greek and Roman cultures as the centre of 
world history.’63 Smith recognized this trajectory as myth, but took Winckelmann’s 
foregrounding of ancient Greece as an example of art historiography’s 
cosmopolitanism rather than its Eurocentric tendencies—when arguably it is an 
example of both. Smith also took Winckelmann’s aesthetic-ethnology for granted.64  
Winckelmann’s aesthetic-ethnology is more than academic. His motive was 
explicitly nationalist. Winckelmann looked to the exotic culture of ancient Greece  
61  Donald Preziosi, 'Art as History: Introduction', in Donald Preziosi (ed.), The Art of Art History: A 
Critical Anthology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 26.  
62  See Enrique Dussel, 'Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism', Nepantla: views from south, 1: 3, 2000, 
465-78.  
63  Dussel, 'Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism', 468.  
64  Because ‘modernity is the harbinger of identity’, Tomlinson observed, it has become ‘a common 
assumption that identity-formation’ takes the ethnocentric and nationalist ‘forms of identity 
construction as we currently understand it in the global-modern West’. (John Tomlinson, 
'Globalization and Cultural Identity', in David Held and Anthony G. Mcgrew (eds.), The Global 
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2nd edn., Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003, 271.)  
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not as a disinterested scholar but as a model for the taste and style of his time and 
place. His primitivism was a displaced nationalism that, at this time of Rome’s 
dominance, opened a space for German art.65 Winckelmann was based in Dresden, 
then the centre of German art. While he proffered the challenge of Athens, he never 
actually went there. Firstly, ancient Athens was in his imagination not in Athens, 
and secondly, as Belting observed, ‘much of ancient Athens was in Dresden’ and 
Winckelmann even compared Dresden to an Athenian ‘colony’.66 ‘To seek these 
sources once meant to go to Athens; but from now on,’ he declared, ‘Dresden will be 
the Athens of artists.’67   
Arguably, the discipline of art history took such strong roots in Germany as 
an antidote to its cultural cringe. Listen to one of Winckelmann’s most ardent 
German admirers, Johnann Wolfgang Goethe, in an ironic rebuke of Winckelmann, 
complaining about the lack of appreciation of Gothic architecture barely five years 
after Winckelmann’s death. Goethe was referring to Strasbourg cathedral, then the 
tallest building in the world:   
 
And now I should not be angry … when the German art scholar, upon the 
hearsay of jealous neighbours, does not appreciate his superiority, belittles his 
work with the misunderstood word “Gothic”, when he should thank God to 
be able to proclaim aloud that there is German Architecture, our architecture, 
when the Italian can boast of none of his own, much less the Frenchman.68 
 
Goethe’s paean to local indigenous ‘primitive’ art—albeit a hymn to 
Christendom—also praised, in a deliberate parallel move, Oceanic art recently 
brought back from Cook’s voyages. Here he also followed Winckelmann, who was 
ecstatic ‘at the swift Indian, as he hunts the stag on foot’.69 Primitivism, nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism’s world-consciousness were the coordinates by which the first 
histories of art were written. Indeed, for all his youthful patriotism, Goethe would 
soon become a leading cosmopolitan of his age, further illustrating that the line 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is a fine and necessary one in the era of 
Imperialism.70 This necessary tension was evident in the discipline of art history as it 
came of age at the turn of the twentieth century. The next several decades were the 
heyday of nationalist and world art histories of various persuasions. Germany was a  
65  See Moshe Barasch, Modern Theories of Art: From Winckelmann to Baudelaire, Volume1, New York: 
New York University Press, 1990, 103. 
66  Belting, The Germans and Their Past, 19. 
67  Johann Winckelmann, 'Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Art in Painting and Sculpture', in 
Elizabeth Gilmore Holt (ed.), A Documentary History of Art, Volume 2, Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958, 337. 
68  Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, 'Of German Architecture', in Holt, 366. 
69  He admired ‘how easily the blood courses through his veins; how supple and swift will be his 
nerves and muscles, how lithe his whole body!’ (Johann Winckelmann, 'Thoughts on the Imitation of 
Greek Art in Painting and Sculpture', 338) 
70  As Marxist theorist Frederic Jameson explained: ‘National allegory should be understood as a 
formal attempt to bridge the increasing gap between the existential data of everyday life within a given 
nation state and the structural tendency of monopoly capital to develop on a worldwide, essentially 
transnational scale.’ (Frederic Jameson, Fables of Aggression : Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 94.) 
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battleground between cosmopolitans and patriotic appeals to German art that cast 
aspersions on foreign avant-gardism.71  
In this respect a clear and unbroken genealogy can be traced from Smith’s 
writing, begun during the 1939-45 war, to this German tradition. Smith also 
inherited the teleological narrative of Winckelmann’s historiography, namely its 
linear movement of birth, maturity and decline. It was a common Enlightenment 
concept, already evident in Vasari’s Lives (1550) and echoed later in Hegel’s and also 
Spengler’s historiography. It was also an inheritance from Christendom. In the 
translation from Christendom to the idea of Europe, argues Delanty, the ideology of 
Christendom was sublimated rather than foreclosed. In this way Europe’s secular 
forms—the nation state, modernity, modernist culture—assumed the character of a 
master narrative i.e. a narrative of modernity projected into the teleological 
structure of Christian theology. Delanty dubbed it the ‘Eurocentric fallacy’.72 As a 
thinly disguised theology, it became a moral concept with which to legitimize the 
actions of European states and then the Western world, just as Christendom had 
legitimized the actions of medieval monarchs. While several turn-of-the-twentieth-
century art historians such as Riegl and Wölfflin were critical of such teleology, 
Smith remained wedded to it.73  
Art historiography is a child of the Enlightenment and the classic idea of 
Europe. However, after the 1914-18 war the verities of Enlightenment lost their 
moral legitimacy and anti-colonial nationalist movements of liberation began to 
challenge the hegemony of the classic idea of Europe. Within this ferment emerged 
the radical surrealist excursions of the 1920s and 30s, which vividly imagined what 
Smith called ‘the ruins of Europe’s grand imperial project’.74 Their fragmented 
vision contested the teleology of art historiography and indeed the classic idea of 
Europe. In exhibitions, artworks and texts, the surrealists juxtaposed images and 
objects that disrupted the accepted order of things and privileged the repressed and 
outmoded. While the surrealist worldview drew on utopian and primitivist ideas, 
their critique was cast in explicit anti-colonial terms that reverberated with the crisis 
of authority in which Europe’s nations now found themselves.75 This was the time 
that Smith came of age and shaped his worldview. 
After the 1939-45 war a new landscape of identity emerged, namely the 
‘highly integrated’ trans-Atlantic NATO culture. For Smith it was a betrayal of his 
youthful ideals. In 1998 he dubbed it ‘Eurusan’,76 which he noted ‘conspicuously 
ignored the rest of the world’.77 This new worldview, said Hans Belting, found  
71  For a discussion of the latter, see Marlite Halbertsma, 'The Many Beginnings and the One End of 
World Art History in Germany, 1900-1933', and, Pfisterer, 'Origins and Principles of World Art 
History’, in Zijlmans, and Damme. 
72  Delanty, Inventing Europe : Idea, Identity, Reality, 13. 
73   ‘The study of Australian art’, he wrote in 1962, ‘is the study of an art in its beginnings. A national 
tradition always matures slowly and in the arts very slowly indeed. So in this book we see the seed-
time, the harvest still being beyond knowledge.’ (Bernard Smith with Terry Smith, Australian Painting 
1788-1990, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1991, vi. 
74  Smith, Modernism's History, 271. 
75  See James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.  
76  Smith, Modernism's History, 254. 
77  Smith, Modernism's History, 271.  
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consolation in the mythic idea of ‘a shared Occidental heritage’ or trans-European 
culture that appealed to Europe’s medieval heritage and a Europe that supposedly 
existed before its debasement in the Romantic and nationalist movements of 
modern times.78 This idea can be traced to the mid-nineteenth-century politics of 
Mitteleuropa, which after the 1914-18 war developed into the idea of Greater 
Germany.79 Indeed, as Belting suggests, echoes of Nazi ideology, in which the new 
enemy from the east was communism, are not difficult to discern in conservative 
post-war art historiography of the West. Thus the ‘collective amnesia’80 of post-war 
Western art historiography, which said Belting ‘avoided those topics that had 
dominated the discipline before 1945’—namely national and world art histories. 
This is why Bernard Smith’s historiography is anachronistic: it was out of place even 
out of time because he saw in the classic idea of the Europe greater potential for 
world art history than in the new idea of the West.  
The discipline that Smith discovered as he came of age was blown away on 
that fateful day that Place, taste and tradition was published. Yet he still clung 
tenaciously to the old German professors. When Smith wrote in 1962 that 
‘Australian artists have constantly returned to refresh themselves from the deep 
fountains of European culture and civilization,’81 he not only re-invoked the classic 
idea of Europe, he was also writing about himself and indeed others like him on the 
edges of the old empire. However Smith remained too close to old paradigms of art 
historiography. His reverse perspective was not enough. It might recognize that ‘a 
complex dialectic is involved’ in ‘cultural imperialism’, but it remained inside its 
game: ‘a case of attraction and repulsion operating from the centre of empire in 
response to surges of desire and aversion from its colonies’.82 In clinging to the 
German professors Smith rejected the discipline’s Cold War retreat into the 
Occident but he also missed the opportunity to develop a historiography adequate 
to the post-imperial world.  
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